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Jurisdiction of the Court 
This is an appeal of an order of the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC), which denied 
Heber Power and Light Company's (HPL) Motion to Dismiss, issued in a formal 
administrative proceeding before the PSC, PSC Docket No. 07-035-22. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(e)(i). 
Statement of issues presented on appeal and standard of review 
Does the provision of electric utility service, which is not the disposal of 
temporary surplus power, by a municipal electric utility (or in this case, by an association 
of three municipalities who have formed an interlocal government entity) outside 
municipal boundaries, subject the service rendered outside the municipal boundaries to 
the jurisdiction or supervision of the PSC? This is a question of law to which the Court 
applies a correction-of-error standard. Associated General Contractors vs Board of Oil, 
Gas and Mining 38 P.3d 291 (Utah 2001). This issue was raised by HPL in its Answer, 
Record 18 and its Motion to Dismiss, Record 20, and in its Application for Agency 
Review, Record 38. 
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Constitutional provisions, statutes, etc. whose interpretation are determinative of the 
appeal 
Utah Constitution article VI, section 28: 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions. 
Utah Code §54-2-l(5),( 7), (8) and (16): 
(5) (a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having any 
powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships. 
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, 
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
general or special law of this state. 
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and 
person, their lessees, tmstees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing 
any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power for public service or to its 
consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within this state, 
except independent energy producers, and except where electricity is generated on or 
distributed by the producer solely for the producer's own use, or the use of the producer's 
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tenants, or for the use of members of an association of unit owners formed under Title 57, 
Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act, and not for sale to the public generally. 
(8) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, 
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, 
generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity for light, heat, or power, 
and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials, apparatus, or property for containing, 
holding, or carrying conductors used or to be used for the transmission of electricity for 
light, heat, or power. 
(16) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical 
corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, 
telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, 
heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), 
where the service is perfoniied for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally, or 
in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is 
sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, 
or industrial use. 
(b) (i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone 
coiporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat 
coiporation, or independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), 
performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, it is considered lo be a 
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title, 
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), 
or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or consumers 
within the state, for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, for which any compensation 
or payment is received, it is considered to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction 
and regulation of the commission and this title. 
(c) Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility as 
defined in this section is governed by this title in respect only to the public utility owned, 
controlled, operated, or managed by the corporation or person, and not in respect to any 
other business or pursuit. 
(d) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of the 
commission with respect to an independent power production facility if it meets the 
requirements of Subsection (16)(d)(i), (ii), or (iii), or any combination of these: 
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy 
producer solely for the uses exempted in Subsection (7) or for the use of state-owned facilities; 
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer solely to an 
electrical corporation or other wholesale purchaser; or 
(iii) (A) the commodity or service delivered by the independent energy producer is 
delivered to an entity which controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with the independent 
energy producer or to a user located on real property managed by the independent energy 
producer; and 
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(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is contiguous to real 
property which is owned or controlled by the independent energy producer. Parcels of 
real property separated solely by public roads or easements for public roads shall be 
considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection (16). 
(e) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation or public utility under 
this section may continue to serve its existing customers subject to any order or future 
determination of the commission in reference to the right to serve those customers. 
(f) (i) "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public 
utility under this Subsection (16) solely because of that person's ownership of an interest 
in an electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power production facility in this state if 
all of the following conditions are met: 
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power 
production facility is leased to: 
(I) a public utility, and that lease has been approved by the commission; 
(II) a person or government entity that is exempt from commission regulation as a public 
utility; or 
(III) a combination of Subsections (16)(f)(i)(A)(I) and (II); 
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection (16)(f)(i)(A) is: 
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; or 
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or indirectly by 
another person engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; and 
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(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or determined 
by revenues or income of the lessee. 
(ii) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility under Subsection 
(16)(f)(i) shall continue to be so exempt from classification following termination of the 
lessee's right to possession or use of the electric plant for so long as the former lessor does 
not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the electric plant. If the former lessor 
operates the electric plant or sells electricity, the former lessor shall continue to be so 
exempt for a period of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is 
ordered by the commission. This period may not exceed one year. A change in rates that 
would otherwise require commission approval may not be effective during the 90-day or 
extended period without commission approval. 
(g) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for, but has no 
ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration 
facility. In the event of a foreclosure in which an ownership interest in an electric plant, 
small power production facility, or cogeneration facility is transferred to a third-party 
financer of an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility, 
then that third-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 90 days 
following the foreclosure, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. This 
period may not exceed one year. 
(h) (1) The distribution or transportation of natural gas for use as a motor vehicle fuel does 
not cause the distributor or transporter to be a "public utility," unless the commission, 
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after notice and a public hearing, determines by rule that it is in the public interest to 
regulate the distributers or transporters, but the retail sale alone of compressed natural gas 
as a motor vehicle fuel may not cause the seller to be a "public utility." 
(ii) In determining whether it is in the public interest to regulate the distributors or 
transporters, the commission shall consider, among other things, the impact of the 
regulation on the availability and price of natural gas for use as a motor fuel. 
Utah Code 54-2-2: 
As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations, partnerships, 
associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and receivers. 
Utah Code 54-4-1: 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public 
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in 
addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have 
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of 
Transportation Act. 
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Statement of the Case 
The proceeding below was commenced to address Rocky Mountain Power's 
(RMP) original and amended Requests for Agency Action, dealing with the operations of 
HPL and their affect on RMP operations in Wasatch County, Utah. Record 1, Complaint 
of Rocky Mountain Power; Record 9, Amended Complaint and Request for Expedited 
Treatment. This appeal arises from the PSC's denial of a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction submitted by HPL below. Record 34, Report and Order. 
Each party has made allegations intending to portray their position and circumstances in 
their most sympathetic light. HPL represents it is continuing a long tradition of supplying 
electricity to customers where no other provider of electric service is seemingly willing or 
able to provide service in Wasatch County. E.g., Record 20, HPL's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss. RMP portrays itself as ready and willing to serve 
customers in its service territory, including those in Wasatch County, but alleges it is 
constrained in providing service within the subject territory by HPL's aggressive 
competing provision of service outside municipal boundaries, fostered by local 
government entities steering or forcing potential customers to the interlocal entity. E.g., 
Record 30, Response of RMP to HPL Motion to Dismiss. Because of the stage of the 
proceedings below, no evidentiary record exists upon which some of the disputes between 
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the parties could be resolved. However, there is no dispute on the circumstances which 
underlie the legal issue presented on appeal. This factual basis arises from the 
uncontested claims and admissions made in the pleadings submitted by RMP and HPL. 
HPL is an energy services interlocal entity formed by the associated municipalities 
of Heber, Midway and Charleston. Record 20, HPL Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss. Currently, the three cities provide electric service through an 
intergovernmental electric distribution cooperative formed pursuant to Utah Code §11-
13-203(4). Id. These three cities provide electric utility service to customers in Wasatch 
County, both within their municipal boundaries and to an extensive area outside their 
municipal boundaries. Id. This appeal deals only with the utility service provided outside 
the municipal boundaries. The PSC makes no claim of jurisdiction regarding electric 
service provided within the municipal boundaries. See, Logan City v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 271 P. 961 (Utah 1928). HPL makes no claim that the service 
provided outside municipal boundaries is the disposal of surplus electricity, provided 
under authority of Utah Code § 10-8-14( 1 )(d). Record 20, HPL Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss. The area outside the municipal boundaries served by HPL is also 
within RMP's service tenitory, served pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity granted by the PSC. Record 30, Response of RMP to HPL's Motion to 
Dismiss. RMP has facilities m Wasatch County and has been and is willing to scr\e 
customers in the subject area. Id. 
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Summary of Argument 
This Court has concluded a municipality was never authorized or intended to be 
able to engage in the purposeful business of providing electric utility service to customers 
outside municipal boundaries. A rationale supporting a city's provision of utility like 
service within its boundaries, as a municipal function, outside the jurisdiction of the PSC, 
is the control the customers/citizens have over the operators of the municipal electric 
entity. This does not hold for customers outside the municipal boundaries, hence, a city is 
only authorized to make a limited disposal of surplus water or excess electricity, on a 
temporary basis, outside municipal boundaries. Where a municipality or group of 
municipalities engage in operations that extend beyond municipal boundaries, engage in 
operations which no longer affect uniquely the city's residents who, ultimately, control 
the service provider, or engage in operations which affect the interests of those outside 
municipal boundaries such operations pass beyond the exclusive local government 
interest purpose of Utah Constitution Article VI Section 29 and pass into the realm of 
state interests which are subject to a state created regulatory commission. 
Argument 
The Extent of PSC Jurisdiction Over Electrical Corporations Which May be Operated by 
a Municipality 
A. The Statutory Language 
Utah Code §54-4-1 provides, in part, "The commission is hereby vested with 
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power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state, 
"Public utility" is defined in Utah Code §54-2-1(16)(a) as "including] every . . . 
electrical coiporation, . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered 
to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas coiporation or electrical coiporation where 
the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for 
domestic, commercial, or industrial use." Utah Code §54-2-1(8) defines "Electrical 
coiporation" as "every coiporation, cooperative, association, and person, their lessees, 
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trustee, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or 
in any way furnishing electric power for public service or to its consumers or members 
for domestic, commercial or industrial use, within this state, except [for self production of 
a generator's own or the generator's tenants' use or for a condominium owners 
association, which circumstances are not applicable in this appeal]." Utah Code §54-2-
1(5) defines "Coiporation" as "(a) including] an association, and a joint stock company 
having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, (b) 
'Coiporation' does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, 
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
general or special law of this state." And, finally, Utah Code §54-2-2 defines "person" as 
follows "As used in this chapter, 'person' includes all individuals, corporations, 
partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees and receivers." 
Stringing these definitions together, one is apprised that the PSC has jurisdiction 
over all electrical corporations, which includes every coiporation (which includes an 
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association, and a joint stock company having any powers or privileges not possessed by 
individuals or partnerships, but which does not include towns, cities, counties, 
conservancy districts, improvement districts, or othei governmental units created or 
organized under any general of special law of this state), cooperative, association, and 
person (which includes all individuals, corporations [which includes an association, and a 
joint stock company having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or 
partnerships, but which does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, 
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
general of special law of this state]), partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and 
then lessees, trustees, and receivers, who provide electricity to the public generally 01 for 
domestic, commercial or industrial use. HPL argues that since governmental entities are 
expressly excluded, by §54-2-l(5)(b), from the definition of corporation, HPL can not be 
a public utility subject to PSC jurisdiction HPL extends the specific statutory exception 
given foi governmental entities m regards to the definition of corporations to the other 
statutory terms that could include governmental entities, viz persons, partnerships, 
associations and companies. HPL phrases its argument m the terms of legislative intent. 
The PSC agrees that discerning legislative intent is paramount m construing statutory 
provisions and resolving the issue presented on appeal The PSC reaches a diffeient 
conclusion fiom that of HPL. 
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B. Determining Legislative Intent 
In CP National Corp. vs Public Service Commission of Utah, 638 P.2d 519, 522, 
(Utah 1981XCP National) this Court stated, "The fundamental consideration which 
transcends all others in regard to the interpretation and application of a statute is: What 
was the intent of the legislature? All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate 
to it and are helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In determining 
that intent the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to 
serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that can be done consistent with its 
language/" (Quoting Johnson vs State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831 (Utah 1966)). An 
important precedent in divining legislative intent (which actually subsumes the issue in its 
Utah-Constitutional rational) is Logan City vs Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 271 
P. 961 (Utah \92S)(Logan City). In Logan City, this Court addressed whether the Utah 
Utilities Commission (the predecessor to the PSC) had authority to modify rates set by 
Logan City for electric service rendered by Logan City's municipal electric utility to the 
citizens/customers located within the city. The opinion discusses a number of statutory 
references and arguments made there from for the proposition that the legislature intended 
municipal electrical utilities to be subject to the state regulatory commission and the rate 
adjustment was properly done. The opinion notes a number of problems which make it 
difficult for the Court to agree with that position. Id., 271 P., at 965-970. The Court then 
moves to the dispositive ruling of the case, assuming that Logan City's municipal utility 
is subject to the state regulatory commission's jurisdiction and the rate modification was 
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properly done. Given the assumption, the Court rules, if "so construed and considered," 
the actions of the state regulatory commission violate Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution. Id., 271 P., at 970. In conceding the legislature may delegate to a 
regulatory commission authority to regulate a private public utility, "that does not answer 
the question now before us of whether the Legislature by the Utilities Act has taken from 
municipalities the power to fix their own rates and charges in operating and in controlling 
their own plants or systems of waterworks or electrical or other utilities for their own use 
and for the use of their inhabitants and conferred the power on the Utilities Commission 
and, if so, whether it was competent for the Legislature to do so." Id., 271 P., at 971. The 
ruling unambiguously holds the state regulatory commission has no authority to intrude 
upon the city's electric utility's service to the city's inhabitants. Such service is a 
municipal function. The Utah Constitution precludes a state created commission from 
regulating the performance of a municipal function. 
But the issue resolved by the Logan City opinion is not the issue before this Court 
in this appeal. Logan City dealt with the city utility providing electric service to the city 
and the city's inhabitants. At issue here is a city's (or three combined cities) provision of 
electric service to customers who are not inhabitants/citizens of the municipality. A 
municipality is authorized by the legislature to operate a municipal electric utility. Utah 
Code §10-8-14. This Court has held that this authorization, to undertake electric utility 
operations to serve the city's inhabitants, does not authorize a city to attempt to operate an 
electric utility to provide services outside the city boundaries. CP National, supra. Utah 
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Code §10-8-14(l)(d) also authorizes a municipality to dispose of surplus product or 
service capacity not required by the city or the city's inhabitants to others beyond the 
limits of the city. Again, this is not the issue presented in this appeal. HPL is not 
disposing of surplus electricity to those customers located outside the municipalities' 
boundaries in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. 
Indeed, circumstances parallel to or similar to the case on appeal have previously 
been broached by this Court, disapprovingly m each instance. In CP National, supra, a 
number of municipalities formed an intergovernmental cooperative, pursuant to Utah 
Code §§11-13-1 et seq^ to pursue the purchase of an existing private electric utility, CP 
National, which had decided to cease operations. When CP National decided to sell its 
assets to another private electric utility, the cities commenced condemnation proceedings 
to obtain the assets, intending to continue the utility operations through the 
intergovernmental cooperative they had formed. In agreeing that the municipalities were 
not authorized to accomplish their design, this Court stated, "Section 10-8-14 set out 
above authorizes cities to construct, maintain and operate electric light works and 
authonzes them to sell and deli\ei the surplus pioduct 01 service capacity of such woiks 
not required by the city or the inhabitants to others beyond the limits of the city. We 
believe that this language imposes a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It 
negates the proposition that a cift could purpos eh engage in the distiibution ofpoMer to 
localities or persons outside its limits except to dispose of surplus" 638 P.2d, at 524 
(emphasis added) The opinion drew a fiirthei distinction in the authorization for a city to 
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operate a water system as a municipal function, compared to the more restricted 
authorization to operate an electrical system. "The reason for the legislature giving broad 
powers to municipalities in the case of waterworks systems may have been because water 
is a scarce and finite resource, which is not capable of manmade generation or 
replacement as electricity may be." Id., 638 P.2d, at 523. Water essentially exists in its 
utility delivered form before any volitional activities of any utility. Its relative scarcity, 
particularly in Utah, has engendered a complete body of law to put it to use and promote 
its beneficial use. Electricity, however, exists only insofar as the operator of the utility 
system decides to cause its generation. For a municipal electric utility, electric supply 
sufficiency to meet the electricity demand of the city and the city's inhabitants (and any 
concomitant excess supply or surplus) arises solely from the operational decisions of the 
municipal utility's operators. The amount of electrical supply is calculated, planned for 
and generated to meet a specific amount of demand. 
CP National cited to County Water System vs Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 
\954)(County Water). In County Water, a private water utility objected to the provision 
of water service by the city to individuals residing in the private utility's service area 
outside the city boundaries. Although this Court sustained the city utility's limited 
provision of service, concluding it was the disposal of surplus commodity, this Court 
noted, 
the fears expressed by plaintiffs that cities will engage in the utility business 
on a broad scale in competition with and destructive of regularly authorized 
privately owned utilities does not seem to be justified. Such activities are 
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neither contemplated nor authorized by /mr; they have no authority to sell 
water outside the city limits except as expressly permitted by statute, which 
is to sell the 'surplus product' not required by the city or its inhabitants. . . 
But such permissive sale of surplus water is clearly not calculated to permit 
the city to purchase water solely for resale, nor to construct, own or 
manage facilities and equipment for the distribution of water outside of its 
city limits as a general business; the intent is obviously to permit it to do 
those things only to the extent incidental to the development and use of 
water for present requirements and those reasonably to be anticipated in 
connection with the expected growth of the city. Id., 278 P.2d, at 289, 290 
(emphasis added). 
In a later case, this Court reiterated the Utah Constitution based rational permitting a 
municipality to provide utility service, as a municipal function, to the inhabitants within 
its boarders (and the disposal of excess water outside its boundaries) outside the purview 
of the PSC. However, this Court also stated, "[b]ut to just however great an extent a city 
may engage in rendering a utility service outside its city limits without being subject to 
some public regulation is not so clearly determined." Salt Lake County vs Salt Lake City, 
570 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1977) (Salt Lake County).. 
It is in this context, an early legal precedent that a state regulatory commission has 
no jurisdiction to supervise a city's utility service when undertaken only for itself and 
those within city limits (a municipal function), the limited authorization for a city to 
provide incidental, temporary service outside its city limits to dispose of surplus, and no 
greater utility service outside city limits is intended or authorized, that one confronts the 
question of legislative intent respective to statutory application to HPL's intentional, 
persistent, competing utility service outside the city boundaries of HPL's associated 
municipalities and within RMP's certificated territory. HPL may bristle at the wording, 
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but from an unincorporated-Wasatch-County-area customer's perspective (and the PSC's 
view), HPL is operating just like a public utility providing electric utility service. From 
this Court's phrasing, it is 'purposely engaged in the distribution of power to localities or 
persons outside its limits,' 'calculated to permit HPL to purchase and generate electricity 
solely for resale, to construct, own, or manage facilities and equipment for the distribution 
of electricity outside of its city limits as a general business,' and 'rendering such utility 
service outside its city limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so 
clearly determined .' As noted above, from the statutory authorizations for municipal 
utility operations and this Court's precedents, the individual cities which formed HPL are 
only authorized to perform the municipal function of providing electric service within 
their city limits. Service outside their city limits may only be undertaken for the limited 
purpose of disposing of surplus, a condition with HPL does not claim is applicable to the 
service provided in the service area outside the cities' boundaries. That the cities have 
entered into a joint association through their interlocal cooperative entity, pursuant to 
Utah Code §§11-13-101 et seq., does not change their authority nor the application of 
statutory provisions to their non-municipal function operations. "Nothing in this section 
may be construed as expanding the rights of any municipality or interlocal entity to sell or 
provide retail service." Utah Code §11-13-204(6). Non-municipal functions are not 
contemplated within the Utah-Constitution reasoning articulated by this Court in Logan 
City. 
HPL claims a distinction in determining legislative intent concerning PSC 
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jurisdiction and legislative intent concerning authorized municipal utility operations. 
HPL Brief at 26. They are not disparate considerations. As noted in HPL's Brief and in 
the discussion contained in this Court's precedents cited herein, Utah's utility laws5 
statutory provisions have included wording placing municipals within the jurisdiction of 
the state utility regulatory commission. As a consequence, one must ask whether any 
given, post-Logan City, legislative enactment (which is said to indicate intent to withdraw 
municipalities from PSC jurisdiction) evidences a legislative intent to completely remove 
all utility activities undertaken by a municipality outside of the PSC's jurisdiction, or 
whether it is the legislature's recognition of this Court's constitutional based ruling in 
Logan City. Are the statutory provisions a recognition that for the municipality's 
rendering of electricity as a municipal function, authorized to occur only within the city 
limits (and for the limited exception of disposing of suiplus outside the limits, which does 
not apply in this case), a city is outside the PSC's jurisdiction, but where the utility 
activity is outside the city limits and not an authorized municipal function, the city has 
chosen to venture beyond the jurisdictional exemption and become a public utility subject 
to PSC jurisdiction? 
C. Non-municipal Functions 
In this regard, this Court's ruling in Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems vs 
Public Service Commission, 789 P2d 298 (Utah \990)(UAMPS) is instructive. In 
UAMPS, a group of cities planned to construct a powerline to facilitate the cities" existing 
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and future electric service operations through an interlocal entity which they had formed. 
The cities' appeal to this Court raised the Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 28 based 
exclusion, recognized in Logan City, as ostensibly negating the cities' need to submit to 
PSC jurisdiction relative to the construction and planned used of the electric utility line 
they proposed to build. This Court stated, "[th]e effect of UAMPS' petition would be to 
read article VI, section 28 and Logan City and Barnes [vs Lehi City, 279 P 878 (1929)] as 
defining anything having to do with the operation of a municipal utility as a 'municipal 
function,' the performance of which is beyond the reach of state regulation. Neither the 
constitutional provision nor the holdings of Logan City and Barnes can properly be so 
read.", id., 789 P.2d, at 301. Referencing prior precedents, the Court noted "many 
functions traditionally performed by municipalities may be sufficiently infused with a 
state, as opposed to an exclusively local, interest to escape characterization as 'municipal 
functions' for purposes of article VI, section 28." Id., 789 P.2d, at 302. This Court 
presented a number of factors to consider, and which it did consider, that are particularly 
relevant to this appeal before the Court, to determine whether the activity is a municipal 
function beyond PSC reach or one sufficiently infused with state interest to fall within 
PSC jurisdiction. It noted the activity was performed not by a single municipality, but a 
combination. The interlocal entity's utility plant was outside the municipals' boundaries 
and would intrude into the service area of an existing public utility regulated by the PSC. 
The interlocal's utility plant and operations were intended to supplant the services 
provided and offered by the existing public utility. The Court held, "[w]e have little 
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difficulty finding that the construction of this line by UAMPS is 'sufficiently inflised with 
a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, interest to escape characterization as (a) 
'municipal function." Id
 t 789 P.2d, at 303. The Court emphasized its reasoning was 
influenced by the function/activity affecting the interests of those beyond the boundaries 
of the municipalities, the function/activity was not perfomied by a single municipality but 
a combination (evidencing the difficulty of a local government to perform it effectively 
and particularly the difficulty for the local government to consider the interests of all 
those outside the city's boundaries as compared to the PSC), and the function/activity 
being subject to the ability of citizens within the local govemmenf s boundaries to control 
their elected officials so as to control the substantive policies that "affect them uniquely." 
Id, 789 P2d, at 303 Using these same factors, and applying them m the same fashion 
and with the same emphasis as the Court, to the activities of HPL at issue in this appeal 
mexoiably leads to the conclusion that HPL's service in the unincorporated areas of 
Wasatch County aie not the performance of a municipal function It has not been 
undertaken by a single municipality, but a combination They have intruded into the 
seivice terntoiy of anothei public utility outside municipal boundanes The activity has 
operational and financial effects upon RMP. The activity affects not only RMP's 
interests, but the interests of customers served outside the municipals1 boundaries. In 
contrast to the citizens of the municipalities, these outside persons have no control, 
thiough elected officials, of the substantive policies and activities of HPL that affect them 
uniquely HPL's activities outside municipal boundaries are 'sufficiently infused with a 
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state, as opposed to an exclusively local, interest5 to be within the PSC's jurisdiction. It 
must be emphasized that this PSC jurisdictional activity is undertaken at the complete 
discretion of the municipalities involved. Should they desire to retain the Article 6, 
Section 28 based exclusion, they may simply confine their activities to that which is tmly 
local, and justified for the exclusion, and limit their service to municipal functions within 
their boarders. 
Given that HP&L is not performing a municipal function within the Logan 
City/Article VI Section 28 based exclusion, one must ask whether HPL is an entity, 
perfomiing an unquestionable utility function, subject to PSC regulation. Reviewing the 
language used in the statutory definitions, the legislature has used a litany of words 
(individuals, corporation, partnerships, association, trusts, and companies) which 
indicates an intent to cover all conceivable organizations whose actions can make them 
public utilities. And, the legislature has recognized that some of the activities of an 
organization can be subject to PSC jurisdiction while other activities are outside the 
PSC's jurisdiction. Utah Code §54-2-l(16)(c). An entity can be exempt from PSC 
supervision while at the same time subject to PSC supervision, the distinction being 
which activities are being scrutinized. The PSC has a long history of having to separate 
or allocate an organization's operations, costs and revenues into PSC-jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional buckets. It has done so for decades relative to the operations of utility 
telephone service entities whose operations are interstate and intrastate in nature, forcing 
allocation considerations for federal and state jurisdictional areas and also further 
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allocations among multiple states foi the opeiations of one company Relative to electiic 
utility opeiations, the PSC also has a long histoiy and ongoing famihanty m having to 
deal with entities whose opeiations span multiple states, again lequnmg the PSC to 
allocate paits of utility opeiations which aie and those which aie not withm the PSC's 
jurisdiction 
D. Public policies support PSC jurisdiction 
HPL cntiques, as speculation, the PSC's public policy discussion as to why the 
legislature would not have intended municipal utility opeiations that aie beyond those 
authouzed withm city boundaiies 01 that exceed the (not applicable) limited exception foi 
surplus disposal to be non-junsdictional These public policy leasons and lationales did 
not ongmate with the PSC, they come fiom this Court In Logan Cit\, supra, this Court 
stated, 
Because pations, customeis o\ consumeis of a pioduct ot a pnvately owned 
public utility, as a mle have no voice m the handling and management of 
the business, noi m fixing and establishing lates and chaiges, and no 
adequate lemedy 01 rediess against unieasonable 01 excessive 01 unjust 
lates 01 chaiges fixed by a public utility company, theie aie good legal 
leasons foi the state, tindei its police powei foi public good and piotection, 
to fix a leasonable and just late 01 chaigc foi such a utility, 01 to delegate 
the powei so to do to a commission 01 boaid of its cieation But no such 
giound exists to so safeguaid and piotect taxpayeis and citizens of a town 
01 city owning and opeiatmg its own utility foi its own use and foi the use 
and benefit of its inhabitants, foi the consumers of the pioduct and the 
citizens and taxpayeis of the town 01 city ha\c a \oice in the management 
and handling of the plant and as to the late 01 chaige to be fixed The plant 
is then own plant It is then pioperty It is foi them thiough then chosen 
otficeis and boaids, to determine, not only the chaiactei of the plant to be 
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owned and operated, but also the rates and charges to be made and whether 
the interest on and principal of bonds shall be met by taxation or by charges 
from operation or partly from the one and partly from the other. If officers, 
boards, or agents chosen and selected by them do not comply with their 
demands or requests, or fix an unfair or an unreasonably low or high or a 
discriminatory rate or charge, others can be chosen or selected to establish a 
proper and fair rate or charge or consumers may appeal to the courts to 
correct any such abuses. 271 P., at 971. 
In CP National, this Court noted, "[c]ustomers who are non-residents of the municipalities 
would be left at the mercy of officials over whom they have no control at the ballot box, 
and they could not turn to the Public Service Commission for relief" 638 P.2d, at 524. Are 
those Wasatch County customers outside the city limits of the municipalities which have 
formed HPL not affected by the same considerations? Even with respect to the authorized 
disposal of suiplus water, this Court noted those outside the city limits should have a 
determination of what their rights are and are not, a clear understanding of mutual rights 
and obligations vis a vis themselves and the city utility, and opportunity to have a venue 
for deterniming whether the rates charged were reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Salt 
Lake County, supra. Could not the legislature intend for PSC jurisdiction to address these 
matters where a city operates its utility beyond the activities authorized and outside its 
geographic boundaries? To go beyond the performance of municipal functions and to 
engage in a pure business venture to provide utility service outside its boundaries (which is 
not the disposal of suiplus) is a voluntary choice of the city. The city no longer perfomis a 
municipal function, but has chosen to engage in a retail operation. HPL's position just 
does not make sense. Under HPL's position, could not any city then, as well, decide to 
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engage in the retail sale of electronic devices and appliances to customers throughout the 
State of Utah, in competition to Best Buy and RC Willey like retailers, and claim no need 
to deal with a state sales tax obligation imposed upon retailers by the State and subject to 
the Tax Commission of Utah? 
HPL's position on appeal places a municipality inapposite of this Court's ruling in 
Strawberry Electric Service District v Spanish Fork city, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 
\996)(Stra\vberiy Electric). Adoption of HPL's position permits a municipality to do, in 
connection with a non-municipal function, outside its municipal boundaries precisely what 
this Court said a municipality can not do when rendering the electric service municipal 
function within it boundaries . In Strawbeny Electric, Spanish Fork City annexed 
additional areas in which the Strawberry Electric Service District, a public utility, was 
providing electric utility service. Spanish Fork City then commenced to serve some 
customers (selected at the city's discretion) withm the annexed area through extensions of 
the city's municipal electric utility, leaving other customeis to be served by the existing 
public utility. The city undertook this service activity without obtaining the public utility's 
consent for the municipality to seive some customers withm the newly annexed area nor 
compensating the utility for the municipality's invasion of the service territory. This 
Court's opinion is very clear. Although a city has the powei to annex and invade a public 
utility's service area, it may not choose which customers it serves and may only serve in 
an annexed area if it has obtained the utility's consent or compensated the utility for what 
the Court lecogmzed was a protectible property interest held b\ the utility. Here, HPL 
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position enables a municipality to invade RMP's territory without even going through any 
annexation, to perform a non-municipal function by serving customers outside municipal 
boundaries, to select which customers it will and will not serve and to do so without 
obtaining the utility's consent or compensating the utility for damages or loss. HPL may 
protest that it is not selecting which customers it will serve, it is willing to serve any and 
all within its so called service territory. But that is precisely the point. It is HPL's 
discretionary exercise to select what is and what is not (and correspondingly who is and 
who is not) within its discretionary 'service territory5 located outside municipal 
boundaries. Strawberry Electric holds that even in providing electric service to 
inhabitants within city limits as a municipal function, a city must first obtain the public 
utility's consent to so serve. Here, HPL advocates a position that a city may provide non-
municipal service outside city limits not only without the consent of the existing public 
utility, but in spite of that utility's protests. 
Conclusion 
HPL argues that all of these seeming conundrums (providing non-municipal utility 
service never authorized outside city boundaries; municipalities purposely engaging in the 
never authorized or intended retail business of extra-territorial utility service in 
competition with an existing utility; non-municipal function utility service over the 
objection of the existing public utility or without compensation for damages or loss; policy 
arguments for how city inhabitants/customers can protect their interests vis a vis the 
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municipal utility's operators' decisions, but no such capability for customers outside city 
limits; the municipal utility's discretion to choose who to serve outside city limits, but not 
so within the city limits) are precisely the lacunas the legislature intended. The legislature 
really meant to place these circumstances outside the PSC's jurisdiction. It is difficult to 
agree with HPL's position when this Court's opinions state that this was not the 
legislature's intent. As the legislature never authorized 'purposely engaging in the 
distribution of power to localities or persons outside city limits,' nor did the legislature 
'calculate permitting HPL to purchase and generate electricity solely for resale, to 
construct, own, or manage facilities and equipment for the distribution of electricity 
outside of city limits as a general business,' the legislature can not be portrayed as 
intending the 'rendering of such utility service outside city limits without being subject to 
some public regulation.' HPL argues the legislature had an intent for things which the 
legislature never intended. 
The PSC comes to a different conclusion. The legislature was very clear in 
authorizing what a city utility may and may not do. It may perform the municipal fimction 
of providmg electric service within, and only within, city boundaries. A city may provide 
utility like service outside of a municipal boundary only to dispose of surplus if such 
surplus arises in providing utility service for the city and its inhabitants; surplus does not 
exist to intentionally serve outside the city's limits. 
Nor does holding for PSC jurisdiction trench the Utah Constitution rationale given 
in Logan City. Logan City recognizes the city's performance of a municipal function in 
27 
providing utility service within city boundaries. The PSC may not intrude on the exercise 
of a municipal function. However, Logan City and UAMPS do not recognize the provision 
of service outside city limits as a municipal function, the municipal function is viewed as 
confined within the city's boundaries. Logan City does not recognize extra-territorial 
service as a municipal function exempted through Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution. UAMPS similarly holds. County Water notes the only municipal function 
which the legislature has added and authorized to occur outside a municipality's 
boundaries is the disposal of surplus capacity. HPL acknowledges disposal of surplus is 
not at issue in this appeal. 
This Court has identified why customers served outside municipal boundaries 
suffer disadvantage which citizens within the municipality do not. This Court has stated 
the public policy reasons why this disparity between customers should not be. The Court 
has also stated the reasons why the legislature would seek to protect customers from utility 
operators' decisions; why the state would choose to regulate the operations of an electric 
service entity over which customers have no control. It is then not remarkable that the 
legislature addressed all conceivable entities which may operate an electric utility and 
made their public utility activities subject to the PSC's supervision and regulation. Where 
a municipality decides to engage in a non-municipality function and operate an electric 
utility just like any other electric utility, serving customers who have no influence on the 
utility operators' management and decisions, the city has decided to place its extra-
territorial service outside the cloister of the Logan-City-vecognized exclusion and placed 
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the providing entity and the service within the bailiwick of PSC jurisdiction. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
The Court should sustain the PSC's conclusion regarding state commission reach to 
the non-municipal function utility operations outside city boundaries and affirm the 
November 3, 2008, Order. 
Dated this day of June, 2009. 
Sandy Mooy / 
Attorney for the Utah Public Service Commission 
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